Friday, July 28, 2006

Philip Stier on aerosol activation in a global aerosol model

Tuesday, July 25, 2006

Jeff Kimble on improvements in the retrieval of a single excitation

Julien Laurat, Hugues de Riedmatten, Daniel Felinto, Chin-Wen Chou, Erik W. Schomburg, and H. Jeff Kimble (2006) Efficient retrieval of a single excitation stored in an atomic ensemble. Optics Express, 14(15):6912-6918 (24 July 2006). CaltechAUTHORS

Thursday, July 20, 2006

Chris Brennen archives CAV2006 paper

Flagan and Seinfeld groups on water uptake of biogenic SOA

Sternberg, Meyerowitz on Advisory Board of high impact Genome Biology

Genome Biology's first Impact Factor of 9.71 places it in the top 5 research journals in the 2005 Journal Citation Report's highly competitive Genetics and Heredity field, and the 4th most cited journal in Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology. Elliot Meyerowitz and Paul Sternberg are on the journal's Advisory Board. More thatn 45,000 of Genome Biology's wide international readership have signed up to receive its email alerts.

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Meyerowitz group on genome-wide analysis

Monday, July 17, 2006

Ted Wu contributes paper dedicated to Tom Caughey to CaltechAUTHORS

Sunday, July 16, 2006

Cassuto and Bruck -- PARADISE report ETR076

Yuval Cassuto and Jehoshua Bruck (2006) Cyclic Low-Density MDS Array Codes. PARADISE, ETR076, May 2006. CaltechPARADISE

Bohassian and Bruck -- PARADISE report ETR075

Vasken Bohossian and Jehoshua Bruck (2006) Shortening Array Codes and the Perfect 1-Factorization Conjecture. PARADISE, ETR075, May 2006. CaltechPARADISE

Friday, July 14, 2006

Echenique and Oviedo contribution to Theoretical Economics

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo (2006) A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. Theoretical Economics 1(2):233-273 (June 2006). CaltechAUTHORS

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
Keywords: Two-sided matching, cooperative game theory, core